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ABSTINENCE BREEDS CONTEMPT: WHY THE U.S. POLICY ON
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR FAMILY PLANNING IS CAUSE FOR
CONCERN
I. INTRODUCTION
Since taking office, George W. Bush has been forced to act in a series of
unprecedented and highly dramatic developments on the foreign policy
stage. The media focuses most public attention on the issues perceived to af-
fect the lives of American citizens most directly-the aftermath of Septem-
ber 1 1th and the amorphous potential threat posed by any number of Middle
Eastern hotbeds. However, a tectonic shift in the United States' policy on
foreign assistance for family planning has taken place as well. This shift has
affected millions of people in the world's least developed countries. 1
The early stages of this radical change in policy have gone largely unno-
ticed and unchallenged. In light of current events and the relevance of our
"rights" as Americans, it is now especially important to recognize that the
sole voice 2 of our nation is communicating a policy to the world that is
seemingly in conflict with American ideals, and, to challenge its legal un-
derpinnings.
What follows is a critique of the United States' policy on foreign assis-
tance for family planning, and the State Department's recent decision to
deny release of appropriated funds to the United Nations Fund for Popula-
tion Activities (UNFPA) for fiscal year 2002. Part II of this Comment traces
the historical development of the United States' policy on foreign assistance
for family planning and the role of the pro-life movement. Part III discusses
the relevant legislation and subsequent case law. Part IV argues that policy
decisions with a pro-life agenda undermine broader strategic goals of the
United States, and the resulting policy leaves the United States vulnerable to
challenges under National and International law. Part V concludes the cri-
tique.
1. Statement by Thoraya A. Obaid, Executive Director, United Nations Population Fund,
on U.S. Funding Decision (July 24, 2002), available at http://www.unfpa.org/about/ed/
2002/usfunddecision.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Obaid Statement].
2. The distribution of federal power is different as applied to international versus domes-
tic issues. The delicate and complex nature of most international problems requires that the
President speak as the "sole organ" of the United States on issues of foreign affairs. United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES POLICY OF FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE FOR FAMILY PLANNING AND THE ROLE OF THE PRO-LIFE
MOVEMENT
A. Historical Context Before 1984
The foreign policy label attached to foreign assistance for family plan-
ning when it became an appropriated expenditure pursuant to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA).3 In practice, this label empowers the Presi-
dent to speak as the sole voice of the United States on the matter, 4 and en-
courages exploration of the gray area between moral proselytizing5 for po-
litical gain and the exercise of legitimate Executive authority.
The federal government first addressed the issue of foreign aid for fam-
ily planning in response to global considerations of population policy and
control, an evolutionary product of a 200 yearlong debate.6 The early com-
mentators, which included mercantilist and utopian theorists, were not trou-
bled by unchecked population growth.7 Greater population equaled greater
wealth and military strength.8 Alternatively, economists, including Thomas
Robert Malthus, felt that unchecked population growth was actually a threat
to prosperity, and that population growth should be held at a sustainable
level in order to prevent widespread poverty.9 Malthus concluded that,
unless the "moral restraints" of marriage at a later age and extramarital ab-
stinence were adopted, the death rate would rise and restrain population
growth. ° However, as an Anglican clergyman, Malthus dismissed notions of
contraception and abortion as "vice. ' ' "
Karl Marx, who favored the mercantilist and utopian approach to popu-
lation, later criticized the Malthus economic theory. 2 Marx felt that because
population growth was a natural phenomenon and people were both con-
sumers arid producers, the resource limits, which worried economists, could
3. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq. (1961).
4. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
5. The phrase "moral proselytizing" may be used to refer to the pre-emergence stage in
the development of a customary norm in international law. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT. ORG. 887, 897 (1998).
Finnemore and Sikkink use the term in reference to moral entrepreneurs, individuals having
"strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their communities." Id. The success
of moral proselytizing typically requires the support of an organizational platform. id. at 899.
Central to this critique is reservation as to the appropriateness of the United States govern-
ment as an organizational platform for certain issues.
6. Michael S. Teitelbaum, The Population Threat, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992/93, at 63,
70.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 [2003], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss2/6
ABSTINENCE BREEDS CONTEMPT
arise under capitalism but not socialism.13 In 1921, Lenin embraced Marx's
views. 4 Three basic population principles ultimately emerged from Marx-
ism-Leninism: population growth as a natural phenomenon; abortion as a
woman's right, unrelated to population; and contraception as "shabby Mal-
thusianism."' 5
In October of 1946, at the behest of the United States and Great Britain,
the United Nations established a Population Commission. 16 In 1950, the
Commission issued a report, which stated that in some countries, a high birth
rate could pose an obstacle to economic advancement.'7 The report encour-
aged governments to adopt policies that would curb population growth.'8
In 1959, the first U.S. report on the issue of population growth was is-
sued by the President's Commission to Study the U.S. Military Assistance
Program.'9 The report recommended that in order to more effectively ad-
dress the issue of economic development, the United States should assist
countries in formulating plans to deal with the problems caused by rapid
population growth.2' President Eisenhower passed the report onto the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee without commenting on the recommenda-
tion. 1 The Committee agreed with the report. However, the President
blocked the recommendation that the U.S. government provide contraceptive
development assistance to developing countries.2" President Eisenhower felt
that it was inappropriate for the federal government to have a positive politi-
cal doctrine on birth control.23
U.S. foreign policy on population was first introduced by the Kennedy
administration and the adoption of the FAA.24 In 1963, pursuant to the FAA,
Congress authorized funding for research on population problems and family
planning through population control programs. 2
The Johnson Administration continued to give attention to the relation
between population control and development. President Johnson strongly
supported the creation of a Population Office at the United States Agency for
13. Id.
14. Id. Lenin also legalized abortion in the Soviet Union. This was because abortion was
viewed as a woman's right, rather than an instrument of population or birth control. See id.
15. Id.
16. Ruth Dixon-Mueller, U.S. International Population Policy and the "Woman Ques-
tion," 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 143, 146 (1987). At the beginning of the Cold War, the
United States and Britain may have pushed for the establishment of the Commission to de-
velop a counter population theory to the only existing Marxist-Leninist one.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 146-47.
19. Id. at 147.
20. Id. at 148.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 149; Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 67.
25. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 149.
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International Development (USAID).26 In 1965, USAID began to support in-
ternational family planning through grants of foreign assistance, as author-
ized by the FAA. 7
By the mid to late 1960s, the United States and several western Euro-
pean nations began working together to engage the specialized agencies of
the United Nations in population activities.28 However, this effort was frus-
trated by an alliance of Catholic and Islamic governments, led by the Soviet
Union and other Marxist-Leninist supporters who felt that population growth
was a natural phenomenon.29 Then, in 1969, the United States spearheaded
an initiative to establish the voluntary UNFPA.3 ° The purpose of the Fund
was to reduce poverty, improve health, and raise living standards around the
world.31 Before long, the United States was the Fund's largest contributor.
32
President Nixon continued to support international population initia-
tives. During his administration, USAID funding for contraceptive research
and family planning distribution programs grew exponentially. 33 This fund-
ing went towards, among other things, simplified methods of female sterili-
zation and methods of early pregnancy termination that were safe and effec-
tive. 34 Nixon also lobbied for the first global conference on population,
which was held in Bucharest, under the auspices of the United Nations.3 1
The focus of debate at the conference was on the issue of population growth
and its fundamental link to underdevelopment. 36 In order to develop a paral-
lel domestic policy, which reflected the impact of population growth on life
in America, President Nixon appointed the Commission on Population
Growth and the American Future. 37
While the U.S. foreign policy on population quietly subsisted through
the Ford and Carter Administrations, the domestic abortion debate reached a
fever pitch.38 A 1973 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Roe v. Wade, legalized
26. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 67.
27. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 150.
28. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 67.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Government Press Release, Senator Feinstein Calls on the Bush Administration to
Reconsider Decision to Divert $34 Million from UN Fund for Population (July 24, 2002)
available at 2002 WL 7273380 [hereinafter Feinstein Release]; The Bush Global Gag Rule: A
Violation of International Human Rights and the U.S. Constitution, B019 (July 2001), avail-
able at http://www.crlp.org/pub-art-ggr.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Global
Gag Rule].
32. Global Gag Rule, supra note 31; Susan F. Rasky, Reagan Restrictions on Foreign
Aidfor Abortion Programs Lead to a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1984, at A20.
33. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 153. "Total assistance to population programs grew
from $2.1 million in 1965 to $125.6 million in 1973." Id.
34. Id. at 152.
35. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 67.
36. Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 154.
37. Id. at 152.
38. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 68.
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abortion in the United States. 39 In response, disappointed pro-life groups
sought ways to expand their efforts beyond narrowly defined abortion is-
sues."° These groups turned their attention to programs funded by the gov-
ernment, which were meant to aid low-income people in controlling their
fertility. 41 Notably, the same year Roe was decided, Congress passed the
Helms Amendment to the FAA, which prohibited U.S. foreign assistance
from being used for abortion services in recipient nations.42
The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, who had run a staunchly pro-life
campaign supported by a number of pro-life groups, ushered in a new era of
pro-life activism.43 Encouraged by a supporter of the pro-life movement in
the White House, these groups continued to focus on the domestic limita-
tions of federal funding for abortion and contraceptive services. 44 However,
there was considerable opposition from pro-choice groups. ' Undaunted, the
pro-lifers simply sought a path of less resistance.
It did not take long for the pro-life movement to carve out a niche in the
field of foreign policy shielded by a "general public ambivalence towards
foreign assistance."46 When activists were unable to eradicate abortion in the
United States, foiled by those who viewed reproductive freedoms as indicia
of personal autonomy,47 they would simply take a different tack. The pro-
lifers would take their fight to where access to education and marital choice
aspects of personal autonomy4 were of more primary concerns, and where
local actors were dependent on assistance from the United States to achieve
recognition of these fundamental freedoms.49
In 1984, pro-life advocacy groups achieved two things that walked qui-
etly towards this goal, but carried big sticks. First, with the help of support-
ers in the White House, James Buckley, a former Republican Senator from
New York, was appointed chairman of the United States' delegation to the
second United Nations International Conference on Population, in Mexico
City.5° As a senator, Buckley tried, unsuccessfully, to eliminate all U.S.
39. Id. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding the Constitutional right
to privacy is applicable to a woman's decision of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy).
40. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 68. Pro-life efforts had focused primarily on the passage
of a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion. Id.
41. Id.
42. Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 714 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(1) (2002));
Dixon-Mueller, supra note 16, at 153.
43. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 68.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Sylvia A. Law & Lisa F. Rackner, Gender Equality and the Mexico City Policy,
20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 193, 209 (1987).
48. See id. at 213.
49. See Sharon Camp, The Impact of the Mexico City Policy on Women and Health Care
in Developing Countries, 20 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 35, 46-51 (1987).
50. Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 69.
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funds for population assistance.5 Second, the pro-life advocacy groups suc-
cessfully called for a review of U.S. foreign policy on population. 52
Around the same time, on the other side of the globe, the new Chinese
leadership was rejecting the Marxist-Leninist population ideals, which had
been embraced by Maoist leaders.53 In China, it seemed as though the future
of socialism now depended on limiting fertility. 54 Political officials at all
levels heralded the Malthusian economic theory, as well as the abortion and
contraception he opposed.55
Ironically, as this was taking place in China, conservative political advi-
sors in America were moving closer towards the Marxist theory. 56 They be-
gan to argue that "rapid population growth was, at worst, a neutral factor in
economic development-and indeed might be a positive force so long as the
'correct' economic systems were in place."57 These arguments were pro-
moted in background papers that were then presented to the Reagan White
House.5 8
B. Historical Context 1984-2000
In 1984, in his address to the UN Conference in Mexico City, Buckley
announced President Reagan's newly revised population policy.5 9 The
"Mexico City Policy" pronounced that rapid population growth was a neutral
phenomenon, and any alleged population problem actually resulted from too
much government control and "an outbreak of intellectualism which attacked
science, technology and the very concept of material progress."6 The Mex-
ico City Policy imposed additional restrictions on foreign assistance made
pursuant to the FAA. Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (FNGO's),
to which USAID provided population assistance, were prohibited from using
not only USAID funds to provide or promote abortion as a method of family
planning, but non-USAID funds as well.6'
In order to implement this policy, a Standard Clause, outlining the re-
strictions, was inserted into all contracts and cooperative agreements for aid
disbursed pursuant to the FAA.62 In order to remain eligible for USAID
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 70.
54. Id.
55. ld.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Policy Statement of the United States of America at the United Nations International
Conference on Population, 2d Sess., Mexico City (Aug. 6-13, 1984) [hereinafter Mexico City
Statement]; Rasky, supra note 32.
60. Rasky, supra note 32; Teitelbaum, supra note 6, at 69.
61. Camp, supra note 49, at 35.
62. Ctr. for Reproductive Law and Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2002).
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funding the Standard Clause required FNGO's to certify in writing that they
would "not, while receiving assistance under the grant, perform or actively
promote abortion as a method of family planning in [US]AID-recipient
countries or provide financial support to other foreign nongovernmental or-
"63ganizations that conduct such activities.
Population assistance funding was further restricted by the Kemp-
Kasten Amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 1985,
which codified a new strain of Executive discretion. 64 Under Kemp-Kasten,
none of the funds made available pursuant to the Appropriations Act could
be "made available to any organization or program which, as determined by
the President of the United States, supports or participates in the manage-
ment of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization. 65
As a result of the Executive discretion afforded by Kemp-Kasten, the
$10 million earmarked for UNFPA that year, 1985, was withheld, although
not because UNFPA was an "organization which includes as part of its
population planning programs involuntary abortion. "66 Even though
"UNFPA neither fund[ed] abortions nor support[ed] coercive family plan-
ning practices through its programs," the funds were withheld because of the
UNFPA presence in China. 67
The People's Republic of China had adopted a one-child-per-family pol-
icy, as a means of controlling rapid population growth.68 There were suspi-
cions by "[s]ome U.S. policyrnakers" that this policy was enforced, in part,
through coerced abortions and involuntary sterilizations.6 9 The UNFPA
funds for fiscal year 1985 were denied on the grounds that the practices of
the family planning programs in China were "such that any support for that
country's programs is linked with and gives the appearance of condoning its
practices."7 After spearheading its creation in 1969, the U.S. denied funding
to the UNFPA in 1985 based on a subjective interpretation of the Kemp-
Kasten language rather than any evidentiary proof of wrongdoing.
The Mexico City Policy and the Standard Clause restrictions remained
in place during the first Bush Administration, and the U.S. continued to
forego funding of the UNFPA. The Mexico City Policy and the Standard
Clause were both repealed by President Clinton in 1993, but Kemp-Kasten
remained a part of the yearly Appropriations Acts.71
63. Id.
64. Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 99 Stat.
293 (1985) [hereinafter Appropriations Act].
65. Id. See Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
66. Population Inst., 797 F.2d at 1065.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Ctr. for Reproductive Law and Policy v. George W. Bush, No. 01 CIV. 4986(LAP),
2001 WL 868007, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2001).
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During the Clinton Administration, in 1994, there was an International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo, Egypt.7 2
The ICPD was lauded as a "watershed event," because "it moved away from
traditional ideas of family planning and embraced the idea that giving
women more control over their lives would provide a check against explo-
sive population growth."73 The United States delegation to the Conference
was instrumental in drafting the ICPD Programme of Action, which set out
three principal goals: to provide universal access to health and primary edu-
cation; to reduce maternal mortality and HIV/AIDS; and to advance gender
equality.74 The work of UNFPA would be crucial to meeting these goals
around the world.
75
C. Historical Context 2000-2002
1. George W. Bush
Shortly after taking office, President Bush announced that he would re-
instate the "Mexico City Policy."76 Although Congress had already appropri-
ated $34 million to the UNFPA for fiscal year 2002, Bush delayed the re-
lease of the funds after he took office.7 7 The delay was due to new
allegations, made by a small group of pro-life extremists, regarding UNFPA
involvement in China.78 The Administration sent a fact finding team to in-
vestigate the allegations and to determine whether it was appropriate to re-
lease the funds.
79
In July of 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the decision
to deny the release of $34 million that was appropriated for UNFPA family
planning programs.8" Based on an interpretation of Kemp-Kasten, as part of
72. James Dao, U.S. May Abandon Support of U.N. Population Accord, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com2002/11/02/intemational/asia/
02ABOR.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2002).
73. Id.
74. Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, Executive Director of UNFPA, Statement at the 2002 Inter-
national Parliamentarian's Conference on the Implementation of the ICPD Programme of Ac-
tion, Ottawa, Canada (Nov. 21-22, 2002), available at http://www.unfpa.org/about/
ed/2002/ottawa.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2002) [hereinafter ICPD Statement].
75. Id.
76. Memorandum For the Administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development: Restoration of the Mexico City Policy, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,303 (Mar. 28, 2001).
77. Michelle Goldberg, A $34 million "political payoff' (July 23, 2002), available at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/07/23/unfpa/print.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
78. id. The allegations were made by an organization called the Population Research In-
stitute. Id.
79. Id.
80. Letter from Colin Powell, Secretary of State, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the
United States Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations (July 23, 2002), available at
http://www.unfpa.org/news/2002related-documents/usfundingreport0l.pdf (last visited Nov.
15, 2002).
8
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the Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002, the funds were denied because
UNFPA allegedly played a prohibited role in what has been interpreted as
China's practice of coercive abortion.8 This decision was made, even
though UNFPA: certified that they in no way support coercive abortion; in-
vestigated allegations of coercive abortion and withdrew funding where ap-
propriate; and separated U.S. donations in different accounts, which certified
that none of the money went to China.82 The State Department promised in-
stead to put the money towards the USAID Child Survival and Health Pro-
gram Fund. 3 This decision was inconsistent with the findings set out in the
fact finding team's report.84 Also, USAID serves significantly fewer coun-
tries than UNFPA, 5 and the permissible scope of the Agency's work is lim-
ited. 6
The evolution of United States involvement in international family
planning programs, rooted in global population concerns, has yielded a po-
litical forum for abortion policy making, unfettered by the constitutional re-
strictions imposed on the domestic abortion debate.87 While the President
has broad discretion to set policy in Foreign Affairs matters, this decision
undermines broader policies of the United States regarding population, fam-
ily planning and development.88
III. RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW
A. Legislative Context
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) was the first statutory au-
thority to support international economic development with U.S. funds. The
FAA declares Congressional policy on foreign development assistance.89
Under the FAA:
[the] principal objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the
encouragement and sustained support of the people of developing coun-
tries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to
81. Id.; Richard Boucher, Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing
(July 22, 2002), transcript available at http://www.state.gov./r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/12036pf.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter July 22 Press Briefing].
82. Obaid Statement, supra note 1.
83. July 22 Press Briefing, supra note 81.
84. Obaid Statement, supra note 1.
85. July 22 Press Briefing, supra note 81. USAID is involved in family planning pro-
grams in 60 countries. Id. UNFPA provides family planning services in 142 countries. Obaid
Statement, supra note 1.
86. July 22 Press Briefing, supra note 81.
87. Global Gag Rule, supra note 31. See also James Dao, U.S. Raises Abortion Issue at
Conference on Families, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2002, at A4.
88. Dao, supra note 72.
89. 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2002).
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development and to build the economic, political and social institutions
which will improve the quality of their lives.
90
In 1973, Congress adopted the Helms Amendment to the FAA, which
states that "[n]one of the funds made available to carry out this subchapter
may be used to pay for any biomedical research which relates, in whole or in
part, to methods of, or the performance of, abortions or involuntary steriliza-
tion as a means of family planning."91 This restriction was applicable only to
U.S. government funds.92 Under the Helms Amendment, FNGO's receiving
U.S. assistance were still able to promote abortion with non-U.S. funds.93
After the addition of Kemp-Kasten in 1985, the President delegated the
authority to administer the voluntary population planning policy to the Sec-
retary of State, who then delegated it to the Director of the United States In-
ternational Development and Cooperation Agency. 94 This authority was then
delegated to the Administrator of the Agency for International Develop-
ment95 because funding for the UNFPA was appropriated as part of a USAID
managed account.96
Currently, any funding for UNFPA comes out of the State Department's
International Organizations and Programs Account. 97 Because of the source
of UNFPA funds, the President delegated the authority to implement Kemp-
Kasten to the Secretary of State in 1995.98 So, as it currently stands, the Sec-
retary has the authority to make the Kemp-Kasten determination, as to
whether a particular program or organization supports or participates in a
program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization.
In light of these delegations of authority, under Kemp-Kasten, it is not
just the President who gets to "furnish assistance, on such terms and condi-
tions as he may determine, for voluntary population planning." 99 Rather, a
political appointee, the Secretary of State, gets to determine the terms and
conditions under which foreign assistance is given for voluntary population
planning, while another appointee, the USAID Administrator, ensures that
90. Id.
91. 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(3) (2002). See DKT Mem'l Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887
F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
92. Ctr. for Reproductive Law and Policy, 304 F.3d at 187.
93. Id.
94. Exec. Order No. 12,163, 44 Fed. Reg. 56,673 (Sept. 29, 1979). See Planned Parent-
hood v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 915 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990).
95. IDCA Delegation No. 1, 44 Fed. Reg. 57,521 (1979) reprinted as amended in 45
Fed. Reg. 74,090 (Nov. 7, 1980). See Planned Parenthood, 915 F.2d at 61.
96. See Analysis of Determination that Kemp-Kasten Amendment Precludes Further
Funding to UNFPA, Pub. L. No. 107-115, available at http://www.unfpa.org/news/2002/re-
lateddocuments/usfundingreport.02.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Analysis of
Determination].
97. Id.
98. id.
99. 22 U.S.C. § 215lb(b) (2002).
10
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the President's population policy is implemented by aid recipients once the
determinations are made.' 00
B. Case Law
The text of the U.S. Constitution makes scant reference to definitive
Foreign Affairs powers. Article II bestows upon the Executive, as "Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,"' 0. the authority
to "make treaties." ' 2 Article I gives Congress the power to declare war and
spend money.'0 3 When the Executive and Legislative branches seek to re-
strain the other with their respective swords of vague Constitutional author-
ity, the Judicial branch is called upon for its soothsayings.104
However, the judiciary will only rarely involve itself in matters that may
be deemed foreign affairs.'0 5 Thus, a brave instigator of such a challenge
must successfully navigate an obstacle course of nearly insurmountable jus-
ticiability doctrines before the federal courts will even consider the merits of
the case.0 6 The limited case law challenging the constitutionality of different
aspects of the restrictions placed on foreign assistance for family planning
has, for the most part, fallen prey to these doctrines of judicial restraint.
1. Alan Guttmacher Institute v. McPherson
The Alan Guttmacher Institute, and other professionals in the field of in-
ternational population control and family planning, brought an action against
M. Peter McPherson, the Administrator of USAID when the Agency de-
clined to fund publication of the Institute's journal, International Family
Planning Perspectives (Perspectives).10 7 Perspectives addressed issues of in-
ternational population control and family planning. 08 Funding was denied
because, inter alia, the journal contained two articles that USAID personnel
perceived as advocating abortion.'0 9 In the past, the Institute received fund-
ing for Perspectives from USAID, pursuant to the FAA." 0
100. See Analysis of Determination, supra note 96.
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
102. Id. § 2.
103. Id. art. I,§8.
104. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
105. See Population Inst., 797 F.2d at 1070.
106. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (distinguishes between issues of justi-
ciability versus jurisdiction).
107. Alan Guttmacher Inst. v. McPherson, 805 F.2d 1088, 1089 (2d Cir. 1986).
108. Id.
109. Id
I10. Id.
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In 1982, when the Institute applied for funding for 1983, its application
was denied.'11 In its Complaint, the Institute set forth five causes of action:
first, that the funding was denied because of pro-abortion views expressed
other than in the journal, and thus violated the First Amendment; second,
that the denial of funding violated the First and Fifth Amendments because
USAID's decision was "motivated by the accurate reporting of information
in Perspectives;" third, that the denial violated the FAA because the FAA
"affirmatively permitted funding the publication of articles that contained
information about the use and incidence of abortion and that were neutral;"
fourth, that the denial of funding violated "the Due Process Clause because
the decision not to renew funding was not preceded by a hearing;" and fifth,
that the denial was an "arbitrary agency action in violation of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act."'"12
The court dismissed the third cause of action on the ground that nothing
in the FAA prevented USAID from deciding not to fund the "publication of
neutral information about abortion." 113 The fourth cause of action was dis-
missed because the Institute lacked a property interest in the funds." 4 The
fifth cause of action was dismissed because USAID's funding decision was
committed, by law, to agency discretion, and not subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act." 5 The first and second causes of
action were substantially resolved after USAID offered, early on, to recon-
sider the Institute's grant application without considering activities of the In-
stitute beyond publication of Perspectives, or the two articles that had been
initially construed by the Agency to advocate for abortion." 6 Since the harm
alleged in the first two causes of action had been redressed by a reconsidera-
tion of the Institute's grant application, the remaining litigation dealt with
the Institute's efforts to prevent a dismissal of the constitutional challenges
on mootness grounds." 7
The Institute was ultimately successful on this point."' Although the In-
stitute brought the suit just after the announcement of the Mexico City Pol-
icy and the imposition of the Standard Clause provisions, the alleged harm
occurred in 1982.' Therefore, this lawsuit may have been brought in order
to gauge the new policy's resistance to statutory versus constitutional chal-
lenges.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1092.
114. Id. at 1090.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1091.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1096.
119. Id. at 1090.
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2. Planned Parenthood Federation of America v. Agency for International
Development
The first case to directly challenge the exercise of Presidential discre-
tion, on the issue of voluntary population policy, was Planned Parenthood
Federation of America v. Agency for International Development. 12 Planned
Parenthood sued USAID and the Agency administrator, M. Peter McPher-
son, alleging that the Mexico City Policy and the Standard Clause were
without statutory authority.12 ' Planned Parenthood claimed that the Mexico
City Policy was not a decision about foreign affairs, but was instead a re-
sponse by the Reagan Administration to domestic political pressure, and was
adopted to serve domestic political interests rather than a legitimate foreign
policy purpose. 122 Allegedly, the "reason for the promulgation of the policy
and the Standard Clause was to advance the Reagan Admiistration's effort
to suppress pro-choice views and activities in the United States ... and not
for any purported concern with foreign policy or other legitimate govern-
mental purpose. "123 Plaintiffs also alleged that the Mexico City Policy and
the Standard Clause violated their constitutional rights to speech, association
and privacy. 2 4 The government defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, claiming that the challenges
were non-justiciable political questions. 125 The District Court for the South-
ern District of New York granted defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that
the Mexico City Policy and the Standard Clause were within the statutory
and administrative authority of defendants, and that the constitutional claims
presented non-justiciable political questions. 26
The Court of Appeals affirmed the statutory and administrative author-
ity of the defendant, and affirmed the finding that a challenge to the Mexico
City Policy itself was a non-justiciable political question. 27 The court re-
versed the finding of a non-justiciable political question with regards to the
First Amendment challenges to the Standard Clause as a means of imple-
menting the Mexico City Policy. 28
On remand, Planned Parenthood argued that a dismissal for failure to
state a claim was inappropriate, because their challenge to the motives be-
hind the government's implementation of the Mexico City Policy, through
insertion of the Standard Clause into grant agreements, required discovery
120. No. Civ. 0248 (JMW), 1990 WL 26306 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1990).
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. at *7 (citing compl. 30).
123. Id. (citing compl. 97).
124. Id. at *2.
125. Id.
126. Planned Parenthood, 915 F.2d at 61.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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and a trial.'29 However, the district court held that Plaintiffs challenges to
the motives behind the Mexico City Policy were non-justiciable, in that they
went to the policy itself, and not its implementation.' 3 Because the Policy
was non-justiciable, so too were the challenges. The District Court held that
Planned Parenthood failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted because the Standard Clause was the least restrictive means of im-
plementing an unreviewable policy. 3' The District Court granted the gov-
ernment's motion on those grounds.132 The Court of Appeals affirmed.133
3. DKT Memorial Fund v. Agency for International Development
In the midst of the Planned Parenthood litigation, DKT Memorial Fund
v. Agency for International Development'3 4 set forth another challenge to the
FAA funding restrictions. DKT Memorial Fund, a domestic nongovernmen-
tal organization (DNGO), and two FNGO's, Parivar Seva Sanstha (PSS)'35
and Population Services Family Planning Programmes Ltd. (PSFP),'36 had
contracted jointly for the purpose of carrying out family planning projects. 137
One of these projects sought to join educators and mobile medical teams that
would then be sent to rural areas in India to provide comprehensive family
planning services.'3 8 The project was meant to complement the efforts of the
Indian government, with regards to rural family planning services, and
would last for four years. 3 9 The teams would not provide abortion services
or involuntary sterilizations. 4 None of the plaintiffs had ever applied for,
nor been denied, receipt of a USAID family planning grant.' 4 '
In 1983, in an effort to secure funding to carry out the joint contracts
with DKT and PSFP, PSS applied to the Indian government for a subgrant
under India's Private Voluntary Organizations for Health Project (Pro-
ject). 42 The PSS subgrant application was not an application to USAID.'4 3
129. Planned Parenthood, 1990 WL 26306, at *7.
130. Id. at *8.
131. Id. at *7.
132. Id. at *8.
133. Planned Parenthood., 915 F.2d at 59.
134. 630 F. Supp. 238 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1986).
135. Id. PSS, a registered nonprofit society in India, operates family planning clinics
which provide "a comprehensive range of family planning services, including abortion." Id.
136. PSFP, "a nonprofit charity registered in the United Kingdom and a member of the
International Council of Voluntary Agencies... provides technical assistance in the operation
of comprehensive family planning clinics around the world . . . and engages in certain activi-
ties relating to voluntary abortion." Id. at 240.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 241.
142. Id.
143. Id.
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2 [2003], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol33/iss2/6
ABSTINENCE BREEDS CONTEMPT
USAID's involvement in the Project was based on a 1981 grant agreement,
in which the United States provided funding for the Project.'" The Indian
Ministry for Health and Family Welfare had overall responsibility for man-
agement of the Project and its funding. 45 However, a Special Grants Com-
mittee, together with the USAID mission in India, would screen applications
for subgrants related to the Project and inform the applicants whether they
had been awarded funding. 146
In February of 1985, the USAID mission in India reviewed PSS's appli-
cation and then informed the Indian Ministry that USAID could not accept
it. 141 The Ministry undersecretary, K.L. Bhatia, told PSS that the Indian
Government rejected the application, on the ground that PSS "primarily per-
forms or promotes abortion as a method of family planning and such activi-
ties" were not eligible for Project funding, because of the Standard Clause
restrictions.
Plaintiffs sued USAID, alleging that the Standard Clause: conflicted
with both the FAA and "important Congressional policies," was arbitrary
and capricious, and deprived them of Due Process of Law.'48 Defendants
moved for summary judgment, alleging that plaintiffs were without standing
to bring their challenge because the injury complained of was not fairly
traceable to the USAID Standard Clause certification requirement, and it was
unlikely that a favorable ruling would redress their alleged injury.'4 9 The
court granted the motion.15°
On appeal, plaintiffs were allowed to amend their complaint, to allege
that they were "otherwise qualified" to receive funds, in order to establish
"nonapplicant" standing.' 5 ' On remand, the district court held that: first,
DKT, a DNGO, had standing; second, as FNGO's, PSS and PSFP had stand-
ing to make a statutory challenge; third, the FAA did prohibit the President
from finding family planning NGO's ineligible for funding if they used
abortion; fourth, the Standard Clause was overbroad and infringed on
DNGOs' associational rights; and fifth, FNGO's did not have standing to
raise a First Amendment claim.'52 Defendants appealed.'53
This time, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court rulings: all of
the statutory challenges to the Standard Clause were unmeritorious, and the
PSS and PSFP claims were dismissed for lack of standing.'54 The court re-
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 238.
150. Id.
151. DKT Mem'I Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 810 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
152. DKT Mem'l Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 691 F. Supp. 394 (D.D.C. 1988).
153. DKT Mem'l Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
154. Id. at 297.
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versed the finding that the Standard Clause violated the right of DKT to as-
sociate with PSS and PSFP.'55 The court also found that DKT had not pre-
sented any ripe claims in which the clauses covering grants to unnamed
FNGO's unconstitutionally interfered with DKT's right to associate. 5 6 The
court then remanded the case with the instruction that it be dismissed.'57 The
disposition of this case illustrates the degree of attenuation between the NGO
and USAID funding, which may still render the NGO ineligible for USAID
funding.
4. Population Institute v. McPherson
The sole action, in which the merits were actually reached, was Popula-
tion Institute v. McPherson.'58 In 1985, after UNFPA was denied funding
because of involvement in China, the Population Institute, together with
other private organizations, filed suit in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, seeking to enjoin McPherson, the USAID Administrator, from
withholding the $10 million that had been earmarked for UNFPA. 159 The
complaint alleged: that McPherson had acted under an unlawful designation
of authority; that McPherson had misinterpreted Kemp-Kasten, so his action
was erroneous; and that McPherson's action was arbitrary and capricious be-
cause there was no evidence of any UNFPA involvement in any program of
coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization. 160
The same day that the complaint was filed, the district court issued a
temporary restraining order, which enjoined the government from disbursing
the $10 million.161 Plaintiffs then sought a preliminary injunction and defen-
dants moved to dismiss. 16 Defendants' motion was granted on the grounds
that: "the Population Institute had standing, that the controversy was not
moot, that the President's delegation of authority to the Administrator was
proper, but that the plaintiffs' challenges to the Administrator's action pre-
sented nonjusticiable political questions.' '1 63
Notice of appeal was filed, but appellants also moved for an injunction
to prevent USAID from disbursing the funds at issue to anyone else.164 Ap-
pellants' motion for an injunction was granted. 165 The court also considered
155. Id.
156. Id. In her dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated that "the
handicap our government has placed on DKT's speech and association is repugnant to the
First Amendment." Id. at 307.
157. Id. at 299.
158. 797 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
159. Id. at 1065.
160. Id. at 1066.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1067.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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the propriety of McPherson's action and the "reviewability and correctness
of that determination as a matter of law."' 66 The court felt that the McPher-
son decision did not present a political question; rather, it was a "simple
question of statutory construction that a court was competent to examine.' '1 67
The court found that McPherson had impermissibly relied solely on
Representative Kemp's interpretation of the Kemp-Kasten Amendment. 16 In
doing so, McPherson had delegated his "responsibility to interpret the will of
Congress to a single member of Congress."' 169 Since the "opportunity to
reach a reasoned interpretation of the statute belongs to the President and his
delegates," the court held that appellant was likely to succeed in demonstrat-
ing that McPherson committed legal error in assuming that he was com-
pelled by law to apply the statutory interpretation provided by the author of
the statutory language. 70 However, the court also noted that, while not be-
fore the court, the issue of whether or not coerced abortion occurred in China
was probably a political question, and therefore, non-justiciable.' 71
Before the appeal could be considered on the merits, McPherson issued
a statement, indicating that he would affirm his decision to deny the UNFA
funds, but had examined the statue in greater detail since the injunction had
been granted.72 According to the court, this statement adequately addressed
the concerns, which had prompted the granting of the injunction.17 In re-
sponse to McPherson's statement, the court vacated the injunction.'7 4 The
court then rejected the government's claims that the case presented a non-
justiciable political question. 175 However, McPherson's decision to deny the
UNFPA funds was ultimately affirmed because, based on the additional evi-
dence that McPherson indicated that he had considered in his statement,
there was some rational basis for his decision. 176
5. Smith v. Atwood
In 1994, after President Clinton had repealed the Mexico City Policy
and the Standard Clause restrictions in USAID grants, U.S. Congressman
Christopher Smith, and several Chinese nationals, brought suit against Brian
Atwood, the new USAID Administrator. 177 These plaintiffs sought to enjoin
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1067-68.
171. Id. at 1068.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1073.
176. Id.
177. Smith v. Atwood, 845 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1994).
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the disbursement of any U.S. funds to UNFPA, alleging that Atwood had il-
legally failed to determine that UNFPA was barred from receiving funding
from the U.S. 78 Defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of stand-
ing, and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' 79 The
district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
Chinese nationals lacked standing to maintain the action, and that the action
was moot with respect to Congressman Smith. 8 '
The district court found that the Congressman's action was moot be-
cause a letter submitted to the court by defense counsel, stated that: "the re-
strictions in the ambiguous language of Kemp-Kasten are not triggered by
activities which are unintentional or remote, or which only indirectly or
marginally relate to a program of coercive abortion or involuntary steriliza-
tion."' 81 Because the court was satisfied that the standard applied by At-
wood, in deciding whether to disburse funds to UNFPA, was within the con-
templation of the Appropriations Act, Atwood's claim was moot.182
6. Center for Reproductive Law and Policy v. Bush
In the latest challenge to U.S. policy on foreign assistance for family
planning, the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (CRLP) sued George
W. Bush, in his capacity as President of the United States; Colin Powell, in
his capacity as Secretary of State; and Andrew Natsios, in his capacity as
USAID Administrator.'83 CRLP, a DNGO that advocates for reproductive
rights, alleged that the Mexico City Policy violated CRLP attorneys' First
Amendment rights of speech and association, Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and Customary International law.' 84
The district court dismissed the action, finding that CRLP, and its attorney
advocates, lacked Article III standing because the restriction in the imple-
menting Standard Clause applied only to FNGO's. 185
On appeal, after conducting a de novo review, the court again dismissed
the action.'86 The court dismissed the Due Process claim for lack of pruden-
tial standing because CRLP was not within the zone of interests protected by
the Due Process clause.'87 The court dismissed the Equal Protection claim as
meritless because, while CRLP had standing, a judicially created exception
178. Id. at 912.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at915.
182. Id.
183. Ctr. for Reproductive Law and Policy, 2001 WL 868007, at *2.
184. Id.
185. Cir. for Reproductive Law and Policy, No 01-6168, 2002 WL 31045183, at *1 (2d
Cir. Mar. 13, 2002).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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called "competitive advocate standing" caused the court to conclude that the
classification challenged by CRLP did not amount to an Equal Protection
violation.'88 The First Amendment challenge was then dismissed on the mer-
its because of another judicially created exception, which allowed the court
to ignore a novel theory of standing because they determined that the identi-
cal legal issue had been determined twelve years earlier in Planned Parent-
hood.189
IV. POLICY DECISIONS WITH A PRO-LIFE AGENDA UNDERMINE BROADER
STRATEGIC GOALS OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH LEAVES THE DECISIONS
VULNERABLE TO CHALLENGES UNDER NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
A. The Legal Rationale for the Recent UNFPA Decision is Problematic
The evolution of United States involvement in international family
planning programs, rooted in global population concerns, has yielded an in-
ternational political forum for the domestic abortion debate.' 90 Private inter-
est groups have been able to impact foreign policy decisions to a degree that
would be unconstitutional in domestic matters.' 9' The recent decisions that
have resulted from such influence actually undermine broader strategic goals
of the United States.'92 Furthermore, if the decisions do serve a legitimate
foreign policy purpose, the legal rationale for not contributing to the UNFPA
would also prevent U.S. contribution to other international efforts, such as
the World Health Organization (WHO) and USAID itself because of their
similarly attenuated funding of abortion related activities. 93
There is increasing concern in the international community over the cur-
rent Bush Administration's aggressive exercises in unilateralism. 194 The
United States could make concessions and reconsiderations on the interna-
tional family planning issue that could help to dispel this concern. The re-
sulting long-term strategic benefit that would result from renewed trust in the
United States and its international reputation is far more appropriate and
would outweigh any short-term domestic political backlash.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Feinstein Release, supra note 31; Global Gag Rule, supra note 31.
191. Global Gag Rule, supra note 31.
192. These goals are spelled out in 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2002). ICPD Statement, supra note
74.
193. July 22 Press Briefing, supra note 81.
194. Dao, supra note 72.
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B. Proposals
1. National
While the courts, on the issue of foreign assistance for family planning,
have been unwilling to wade too deep into the constitutional aspects of this
question in the past, reconsideration is now due. Some of the nuances of the
recent reimposition of restrictions, in light of developments in International
Law and the general tone of the global community, demand a fresh look at
old issues.
In their analysis of the most recent determination that Kemp-Kasten
precluded the release of UNFPA funds, the government cited Population In-
stitute and Smith, as support for the decision.195 In the analysis, the language
excerpted from Population Institute is misleading. The analysis cites Popula-
tion Institute for the proposition that "special deference should be accorded
the executive in those activities that impinge on foreign affairs," which
"strongly sugges[ts] that the executive branch's factual determinations re-
garding China's programs are not reviewable by the judiciary." '196 Yet, in the
actual opinion, the court goes on to explain that the case did not present a
non-justiciable political question, and that there could be a review of the
Administrator's decision.197 As applied to the recent UNFPA decision, and
contrary to the government's interpretation of Population Institute, the fac-
tual determinations regarding programs in China are reviewable by the judi-
ciary.198
The language in the analysis, excerpted from Smith, is equally mislead-
ing. The government contends that in Smith, "the congressman had chal-
lenged a determination by the [US]AID Administrator that 'only clear evi-
dence of knowing and intentional direct funding or support by UNFPA'
would trigger Kemp-Kasten. The court stated, '[i]t is quite clear that such a
standard is in no way contemplated by the Kemp[-]Kasten Amendment."' 1 99
In the actual opinion, the court applied a criminal intent standard, which was
not contemplated by Kemp-Kasten. 200 The court went on to cite language
contained in letter from counsel for the USAID Administrator, which stated
that, "the restrictions in the ambiguous language of Kemp-Kasten are not
triggered by activities which are unintentional or remote, or which only indi-
195. Analysis of Determination, supra note 96.
196. Id. (citing Population Inst., 797 F.2d at 1070).
197. Population Inst., 797 F.2d at 1070.
198. The re-delegation of authority in 1995, from the USAID Administrator to the Secre-
tary of State should not affect the plausibility of this proposal. See Analysis of Determination,
supra note 96.
199. Id. (citing Smith v. Atwood, 845 F. Supp. 911, 915 (D.D.C. 1994)).
200. Smith, 845 F. Supp. at 915.
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rectly or marginally relate to a program of coercive abortion or involuntary
sterilization. 20'
The recent UNFPA decision was based on the finding that UNFPA pro-
grams in China provided computer equipment to the Chinese government.0 2
Presumably, this freed up money within the Chinese government to enforce
the one-child policy through means of coercive abortion and involuntarily
sterilizations.2 3 The fact finding team, sent by the U.S. to China to investi-
gate allegations about the UNFPA, however, "found no evidence that
UNFPA ha[d] 'knowingly supported or participated in the management of a
program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization in [China]. '24 In
the absence of knowing participation or support, and with only an indirect
relation to allegedly prohibited programs, Kemp-Kasten should not have
been triggered by China's UNFPA programs.
While it seems clear that the rationale set forth for the denial of U.S.
funds for UNFPA was not legally sound, the reluctance of U.S. courts to in-
volve themselves in Foreign Affairs matters will probably prevent many of
these issues from ever being addressed. Rather than a direct constitutional or
statutory challenge to an Executive Policy decision, both of which have
proved largely unsuccessful, plaintiffs may have a better chance at success if
the challenge is more contractually based.20 5
Since many of the USAID funding agreements last for several years,
and may overlap with a change in Administration, it may be possible for
some organizations to recover the funding unofficially, as a contractual rem-
edy. This may be possible for programs and organizations that hire educators
and purchase family planning commodities over an extended period of time,
but with the reimposition of the Mexico City Policy and Standard Clause
provisions, or withdrawal of UNFPA funding, they are no longer able to ful-
fill contractual obligations with their employees or suppliers. It may be that
family planning commodity manufacturers would have a cause of action
against the government if FNGO's make up a substantial part of their mar-
ket, but they are prevented from purchasing supplies because of U.S. funding
restrictions.
2. International
There are several International Agreements that may be violated by a
U.S. refusal to fund the UNFPA.2 °6 Most directly on point is the ICPD Pro-
201. Id.
202. Analysis of Determination, supra note 96.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. For an interesting proposal along similar lines see generally Rita Y. B. Carlson,
What if the United Nations Sued the United States?: A Hypothetical Case Analyzing the UN
Charter as a Government Contract, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 525 (2001).
206. See Women's Reproductive Rights, available at http://www.crlp.org/pub-fac
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gramme of Action.20 7 In light of U.S. support of the Conference, it is no
longer appropriate for the U.S. to advocate for the Marxist-Leninist approach
set forth in the Mexico City Policy, which characterizes population growth
as a neutral phenomenon.20 8 The Programme of Action clearly recognizes
the relationship between population growth and underdevelopment. 9 The
goals set forth therein: to provide universal access to health and primary
education; reduce maternal mortality and HIV/AIDS; and advance gender
equality, seek to remedy the adverse effects of this relationship. l The Pro-
gramme of Action also articulated "three essential principles of reproductive
rights": the right to freely decide the number and spacing of children; the
rights to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health; and
the right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of coercion, dis-
crimination, or violence."1 The U.S. claims continued support of those
goals.2
12
Since the agreement is not self-executing, it does not, on its own, create
any enforceable rights at the domestic level.2 13 However, at the international
level, it seems hypocritical that the United States played a pivotal role in the
drafting of the goals and agreements, only to then discredit the International
agency that has undertaken a course towards their achievement.
President Bush claims to be "committed to helping the U.N. to advance
human rights, healthcare, security, and education throughout the world," and
has even gone so far as to proclaim October 24, 2002 United Nations Day.21 4
The U.S. praises the recent creation of a U.N. program on HIV/AIDS. 1 5
rights.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Women's Reproductive Rights].
207. PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. 95.XIII.18 (1995), avail-
able at http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/reports.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Pro-
gramme of Action].
208. Mexico City Statement, supra note 59.
209. Programme of Action, supra note 207.
210. ICPD Statement, supra note 74.
211. United Nations, Report of the International Conference on Population and Devel-
opment, at 43-44, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (1994); Bharati Sadasivam, The Rights Frame-
work in Reproductive Health Advocacy--A Reappraisal, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 313, 322
(1997).
212. Press Release, U.S. State Department, U.S. International Population Policy (Nov. 7,
2002), available at http:/Iwww.state.govlr/palprs/ps/2002/14985pf.html (last visited Nov. 28,
2002).
213. See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, United Nations Resolution as Ju-
dicially Enforceable in United States Domestic Courts, 42 A.L.R. FED. 577 (1979).
214. Proclamation by President George W. Bush, United Nations Day, 2002, Washing-
ton D.C. (Oct. 23, 2002), available at http:lwww.state.gov/p/iolrls/rm/2002/14638pf.htn-l
(last visited Nov. 28, 2002).
215. United Nations Fact Sheet, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Washing-
ton D.C. (Aug. 20, 2002), available at http:lwww.state.gov/p/io/rls/fs/2002/12955pf.html
(last visited Nov. 28, 2002).
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This program brings together the resources of several other U.N. programs,
including UNFPA.21 6
The Bush Administration's insistence on unilateralism undercuts U.S.
sincerity and credibility in the eyes of the international community. 217 The
perceived insincerity is then a threat to national security. Countries that de-
pend on UNFPA services and other U.S. funding resources could be allies in
fighting terror or mutually beneficial trade agreements. Instead, recent deci-
sions have caused skepticism and distrust of the American agenda.218
If the problem is with allegedly coercive practices employed in China,
there are ways in which the leverage of U.S. funding could be wielded less
derisively. The U.S. should continue to support multilateral programs, and
inundate the successful ones, such as UNFPA, with funding. The United
States is an active member of the UNFPA Executive Board.219 If the daily
involvement of the UNFPA in China was troublesome, the U.S. delegation
could have called for a revision of program certification requirements, or
other such in-house accountability provisions. 220 The fact that the U.S. opted
to act unilaterally, choosing instead to call into question the credibility of the
UNFPA, seems inappropriate, and indicative of an ulterior agenda.
The U.S. is the only country to ever deny funding to the UNFPA for
non-financial reasons.2 21 In light of the ICPD Programme of Action, the In-
ternational Law concept of an obligation ergo omnes may, in theory, provide
a possible challenge to the funding decision.222 When the U.S. agreed to pur-
sue the goals in the Programme of Action, it may have undertaken an obliga-
tion owed to all of the other governments who participated at the ICPD not
to withdraw funding for non-financial reasons, because doing so would un-
dermine the principal goals which all parties agreed to pursue. If such an ob-
ligation exists, then any other party to the agreement may take action against
the United States, in order to enforce the obligation.223 In practice, there are
two significant challenges to this proposal. First, the Programme of Action is
not itself a binding treaty.224 Rather, the goals set forth are meant to clarify
the policy and commitment of the international community. 225 This chal-
lenge may be overcome if the obligation not to deny funding for non-
216. Id.
217. Dao, supra note 72.
218. See id.
219. ICPD Statement, supra note 74.
220. See id.
221. UN Newsletter (July 23, 2002), available at http://www.un.org.pk/unic/newslet-
ters/NEWSLETTER020723.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
222. See The Barcelona Traction Case, (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5); The
South West Africa Cases, (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18).
223. Id.
224. Sadasivam, supra note 211, at 322.
225. See id.
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financial reasons can be framed as a customary norm of international law.22 6
The Programme of Action set forth goals to strengthen and implement other
international agreements. 227 The concept of pacta sunt servanda requires that
once a State is a party to an agreement, such a state may not act contrary to
the object and purpose of that agreement. 22 8 The United States is a party to
several of the agreements that the ICPD is meant to strengthen. 229 Since the
denial of funding for non-financial reasons is contrary to the object and pur-
pose of the Programme of Action, it follows that the denial of funding for
non-financial reasons is also contrary to the object and purpose of the
agreements that the Programme of Action is meant to implement.
Second, even if such an obligation was recognized, one of the funda-
mental weaknesses of the United Nations is the lack of any effective central-
ized enforcement mechanisms. 23" This does not mean, however, that the ob-
ligation ceases to exist. The legitimacy of International Law does not depend
on strict adherence to the processes of traditional and familiar institutional
forms.23 Rather, the international community may deem the United States'
denial of UNFPA funding for non-financial reasons, moralistic and politi-
cally suspicious. This may then result in heightened resistance to cooperation
with the United States on other issues that the Bush Administration has
deemed more strategically important.232
V. CONCLUSION
While a measure of Presidential discretion in the realm of Foreign Af-
fairs is necessary, it should not be available as an insulated field where po-
litical supporters may go to get their campaign favors repaid. This is espe-
cially true with regards to a sensitive topic like abortion, where the domestic
226. Id. at 334. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102
(1987).
227. See Women's Reproductive Rights, supra note 212.
228. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
620 (5th ed. 1998).
229. The preamble of ICPD reaffirms Human Rights in these agreements. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976);
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp.
No. 3, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Together, these agreements form the International Bill of
Rights.
230. Sadasivam, supra note 211, at 334.
231. Id. at 333.
232. As this Comment was going to publication, the United States embarked upon the
early stages of the disarmament of Iraq. As events have unfolded in the international commu-
nity, these proposals have rung all too true. The author urges readers to bear this in mind over
the coming months, as questions about international law become increasingly common and
the answers take on an unprecedented relevance.
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debate is hotly contested and largely religious. The U.S. is trying to rally
support from the U.N. and build trust between nations with vastly diverse
cultures and religions. Now is not the time to insist on the infusion of a con-
servative ideological agenda into international agreements. This is not the
meaning of democracy in America. The mere attachment of a foreign policy
label should not permit circumvention of domestic constitutional restrictions
under these circumstances.
When made pursuant to the FAA, foreign assistance for family planning
is about development assistance, not abortion. If the United States claims to
support international cooperation for development and values the participa-
tion of NGO's, then the recent decision to withdraw UNFPA funding is il-
logical and runs contrary to government policy. The decision's hypocritical
legal rationale breeds international contempt for the American political
agenda, and sets the stage for challenges to U.S. foreign policy under Na-
tional and International Law.
To focus so singularly on the abortion issue in international affairs is
short sighted. As the need for international alliances becomes increasingly
apparent, the issue of foreign assistance for family planning should not be
overlooked. The legal underpinnings of these funding decisions and their
treatment in U.S. foreign policy have important implications as reflections of
domestic law and politics, and as potential dealmakers or breakers in the in-
ternational community.
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